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For
Against

4,393
5,121

Total

9,514
The total vote for representatives in Congress on the same
day was 10,205. I t thus appears that the vote on this amendment was much nearer the vote cast for public officers on
the same day than is usual in the case of votes on constitutional amendments.
This is the last word up to date of the people of Rhode
Island to the members of the General Assembly as to whether
the General Assembly shall have the right to call a constitutional convention. The people, when the question was squarely presented to them, refused to give the members of the
General Assembly such a right.
This appears to us to be at least as important in its bearings as the Opinion of the Justices in 1883.
Of course, it may be argued with some ingenuity on the
other side that "the reason why the people rejected the proposed amendment was because they considered the General
Assembly already had the power to call a convention, or that
they disliked the provision requiring a three-fifths approval
of the action of such a convention"; but those are arguments
a little too fine to have been likely to appeal to the ordinary
body of the electors. The latter are not as a rule interested
in refinements, but act in view of a general position or proposition which is readily understandable by people of normal
intelligence; and when they voted by a majority to reject a
constitutional amendment, empowering the Assembly to call
a convention as a means to amending the Constitution, it is
fair to conclude that they meant what they said, and that
whatever might be the rule elsewhere they did not wish that
mode of amendment to be open under our Constitution at
least. There is the people's own reply to the question before
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this Court. A reply which, we submit, has in substance the
same effect as though the negative of this question were actually written into the Constitution itself. To that effect is
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533 (1917), where a majority
of four out of five Judges gave great weight to the fact that
the people had previously rejected a proposal to call a constitutional convention, and held that the legislature should
not disregard that latest expression of the people, but that
such expression of the will of the people should be deemed
as binding on the General Assembly as a- positive provision
of the
Constitution.

2. In 1898 and 1899 constitutional amendments to
authorize the legislature to submit to the people the question whether conventions should be called were rejected.
Subsequent historic factors.
The question as to whether the Rhode Island Assembly has
a constitutional right to submit to the people the question
whether a constitutional convention should be called is not
before the Court at this time, since the precise question submitted is whether the legislature has power to "provide by
law (a) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the
Constitution of the State," i. e., the question contemplates
the possibility of the convention being provided for by law,
passed by the General Assembly, and does not ask whether
the Assembly can or should first take the instructions of the
people.
We shall deal with this question a little more at length
hereafter, but for the moment it is important only to observe
that the General Assembly, having proposed and approved a
form of entirely new and revised Constitutions, in the mode
provided by Article X I I I , twice submitted the same to the
people (in 1898 and 1899), each of which carried an express
provision that "At the general election to be held in the year
1906 and each twentieth year thereafter, the General Assem-
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bly shall by law provide that the question, 'Shall there be a
convention to revise the Constitution', be decided by the
electors." And in both instances the people rejected the Constitution which contained this provision.
This is the last word to date of the people of Rhode Island
to the members of the General Assembly as to whether the
latter shall even have the right to submit to the people the
question, "Shall there be a convention to revise the Constitution?" The people, when this question was so presented to
them, refused to give the members of the General Assembly
such a right.
In view of the foregoing, we submit that the Opinion of
the Justices has been supported by the direct and definite
vote of the people as to the meaning which they wish to be
given to their fundamental law.
That Judge Durfee was correct in his statement that the
existing mode of amendment is entirely practicable, appears
clearly enough from the simple fact that under the provisions of Article X I I I twenty-one amendments have been proposed and adopted, ranging over the period beginning November, 1854, and terminating with the last amendment on
November 4, 1930 (absentee voting). In addition, a considerable number of other amendments have been proposed, in
each case pursuant to the mode specified in the Constitution,
and have been rejected, especially those above referred to in
1883, 1898 and 1899.
At the J a n u a r y session of 1924, His Honor the present
Lieutenant Governor, introduced a resolution relative to
calling and holding a constitutional convention. Section 1 of
which was as follows:
"Section 1. For the purpose of ascertaining the will
of the people of the State with reference to the calling
and holding of a Constitutional Convention, the Governor shall and is hereby directed to call by public proclamation a special election to be holden on the Second
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Tuesday in August, A. D. 1924, to determine the following question:
" 'Shall there be a Convention to revise, alter or
amend the Constitution of the State?'
"Also to elect delegates to said Convention."
The resolution failed of passage, but it will be observed
that even this resolution, introduced by one who will not be
accused of being ultra-conservative, provided not for the
calling of a constitutional convention by the Assembly, but
for the submission to the people of the question as to whether
or not such a convention should be called.
So that we revert to our previous statement t h a t for ninety-two years—the entire period following the adoption of our
Constitution—it has always been generally accepted that the
Assembly has no constitutional power to call a constitutional
convention, and furthermore that, so f a r as we are able to
ascertain, not once has a resolution even been introduced
into the General Assembly providing for the calling by it of
such a convention.
True, there is evidence that it has been considered on two
occasions that the General Assembly had power to submit
to the people the question whether such a convention should
be called, but even this subordinate power was denied by our
Supreme Court in 1883. and notwithstanding the activity
and agitation of such sterling Democrats as the late Charles
E. Gorman, Augustus S. Miller, David S. Baker, Hugh J .
Carroll, James H. Higgins, John J . Fitzgerald, Lucius C.
Garvin, and many others, it appears to have been accepted,
until the Lieutenant Governor's action in 1924, t h a t if the
Constitution was to be amended it must be by compliance
with Article X I I I and not even by submitting to the people
the question whether such a convention should be called.
There is, therefore, a sharp distinction between the period
before and after the adoption of the present instrument.
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Prior thereto, frequent agitation and several conventions resulting in adoption. Subsequent thereto, although at periods
much discussion, no conventions, no call for a convention,
and a distinct opinion by an able Supreme Court that none
could be called, a position acquiesced in for over fifty years—
and all fortified by an express and distinct rejection by the
people of a proposal to put into their Constitution an amendment which would give the General Assembly the power here
in question.
Surely, from the point of view of history, the matter should
no longer be considered open. There ought to be some point
at which matters of this kind may fairly be considered determined. If, contrary to our contention, this Court should answer these questions "Yes", let there be no mistake—the
matter would not be settled, and could not be, in that way.
If this Court, in an advisory opinion, can properly disregard
a similar opinion fifty years ago, it furnishes a cogent and
additional reason why another Court, ten, twenty-five or fifty
years hence may consider the matter still open and again decide in accordance with the original holding, leading to further confusion upon one of the fundamental principles of our
government. But it may be answered that if the answer is
"Yes" a constitutional convention may be held and a new
Constitution adopted which will specifically cover the matter
and set it at rest. We submit that this cannot by any means
be taken as certain. There is certainly substantial doubt, if
a convention should be held and a Constitution framed,
whether it would be approved. Based on our history in 1898
and 1899, there is much reason to anticipate rejection, in
which event the matter would be and remain wide open. On
the other hand, if the Court should agree with the views herein expressed, and should answer the question in the negative, that point of constitutional law at least would be settled for all time, leaving it open, as before, for the submission
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to the people in the constitutional mode under Article X I I I
as to whether the General Assembly should be authorized to
provide for the calling of conventions, or, to provide in the
alternative, for submission to the people of the question
whether such a convention should from time to time be held.
True, a period of time (approximately two years) must
elapse before adoption or rejection, but that is a short time
in the history of a State, and will be more than compensated
by certainty as to the meaning of our supreme law.

D. Consideration of Opinion of the
6 Cush. (Mass.) 573

Justices,

And while we are on that point, it may not be amiss to
dispose of one argument often advanced in support of the
opposing view—it is said that the constitutional mode (Article X I I I ) should not be exclusive, as the convention mode
should be open in case of great crisis or emergency where
hasty action may be vital to the Republic. W e leave those
cases on one side, as was done by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. That case
carries an intimation that in the event of a real crisis, means
would be found to meet it even though that means were in
theory revolutionary. In the present instance, however, we
have no such circumstance. Something in the nature of a
crisis there is, but it is economic and not political, and so
f a r as we are aware, no one claims that any contemplated
changes in the Constitution can do more to improve t h a t
condition than can be or is being done under the present
form of our government. We are threatened by no alien foe,
and the only crises which are referred to by opponents in
previous pronouncements are the alleged need of changes in
the franchise, of the apportionment of the Senate, the redisr i c t i n g of the State, the tenure or constitution of the judiciary, and similar matters. If the existence of "crises" of this
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nature is determinative, then we have been in a crisis since
1783, which leads to the question "How long can a crisis continue without resolving itself into a normal state of affairs?"
The Rhode Island Court considers the Massachusetts case
analogous. Let us examine it a little more closely. From it it
appears (page 571) that if the people were considered to have
a natural right in emergencies or upon the obvious failure of
the existing Constitution to accomplish its objects, to provide
for amendment or alteration, that view,
"would involve the general question of natural rights
and the inherent and fundamental principles upon
which civil society is founded, rather than any question
upon the nature, construction or operation of the existing Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laics
made under it"
That is precisely the view of our Supreme Court, to which
we fully subscribe. To us it means this: That if we are going upon theories of natural right or rights alleged to be reserved, those by definition are not constitutional rights, that
therefore such rights, if they exist at all, are rights of revolution and not of constitutional procedure.
The Massachusetts Court continues, stating its presumption "That the opinion requested applies to the existing Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth and the rights and
powers derived from and under them." So here. This Court
is asked with respect to "What would be a valid exercise of
the legislative power." As it is conceded that the Assembly
has no rights except under the Constitution, then the exercise
of its powers must be pursuant to that instrument and not
upon some theory of inherent right apart from the Constitution. And we may as well say here, with Judge Durfee in
his monograph, that since under Article IV, Section 1, "This
Constitution shall be the supreme law of the State," we absolutely deny the existence of any law, whether it be called
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reserved power, natural right, or "common law right," over
and above the Constitution. If there is another law superior
to it, then the Constitution is not the supreme law of the
State. The two ideas are mutually exclusive. As Judge Durfee said,
"If there be any such law, for there is no record of
it 01* of any legislation or custom in this State recognizing it, then it is, in our opinion, rather a law, if law
it can be called, of revolutionary than of constitutional
change."
The Massachusetts Court thereupon determines that
"Under and pursuant to the existing Constitution,
there is no authority given by any reasonable construction or necessary implication by which any specific and
particular amendment or amendments of the Constitution can be made in any other manner than that prescribed in the Ninth Article of the amendments adopted
in 1820. Considering that previous to 1820 no mode
was provided by the Constitution for its own amendment, that no other power for t h a t purpose than in the
mode alluded to is anywhere given in the Constitution,
by implication or otherwise, and that the mode thereby
provided appears manifestly to have been carefully
considered, and the power of altering the Constitution
thereby conferred to have been cautiously restrained
and guarded, we think a strong implication arises
against the existence of any other power under the
Constitution for the same purposes." (Italics ours.)
The Court then declines to decide what would be the effect
of a purported law, submitting to the people the question of
calling a convention and as to what would be the power of
such convention if called. The effect of its statement upon
this subject is that, without committing itself to the legality
or constitutionality of such a convention, nevertheless if, in
fact, called, its powers would in any event be restricted in
such manner as the General Assembly should have directed
in calling it.
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It is freely admitted that the ease does not go quite to the
point of the Rhode Island case, but nobody can read it fairly
without believing that the Court disapproved of the convention method where the Constitution was silent thereon and
where another express mode of amendment was provided;
and that the convention method was not one which could be
justified under the provisions of the Constitution. But if that
is so, it is not constitutional. To our minds it is therefore
unconstitutional.
Let us examine in another aspect into the alleged distinction between the Massachusetts and the Rhode Island cases.
The opposing contention appears to assume that the Massachusetts case was right, as the Court was dealing with "particular amendments," but that the Rhode Island Court was
wrong because it was dealing with a "revision." In other
words, it appears to be conceded that if the Constitution is
to be "amended," the method prescribed by the Constitution
must be followed, but that if it is to be "revised" either the
legislative method or the convention method is available.

1. Impossibility of distinguishing legally between
"Amendment" and "Revision".
This view necessarily requires an exact definition of and
distinction between "amendment" and "revision." We do
not wish to be too legalistic, as we realize that the question
before the Court is essentially a broad one; but after all,
while we are dealing in essence with ideas, ideas can here be
expressed only in words; and to learn what ideas are behind
the words we must resort to the meanings (ideas) which
those words customarily and properly bear and express.
Both "amend" and "revise" undoubtedly fall within the
scope of the generic word "change"; and the opposition must
therefore clearly indicate when a change which begins as an
amendment becomes so sweeping that it is no longer an
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amendment, but is a revision; and must also demonstrate
that "amendment" is not broad enough to include "revision."
We therefore inquire: I s a change restricted to a modification of the article providing for the qualification of electors
an amendment only? Apparently in the ordinary use of
language it would be. Suppose it is coupled with an amendment providing that the tenure of the Justices of the Supreme
Court shall be for life or during good behavior. Are we still
dealing with amendments? Suppose there is a change solely
in the provision for the representation of towns and cities in
the Senate, and nothing else. That would apparently be an
amendment. If it is coupled with the two modifications previously mentioned, have we a revision?
It is no answer to assert, as do the Twenty-Six Lawyers,
that this is a political question to be determined by the legislature, and nothing with which the Courts have to do. We
are dealing here with rights of a most sovereign and high
character—the constitutional rights of the people—and the
legislature has no power to infringe those rights nor indirectly to destroy them by making its own incorrect definition
of the meaning of words, and then escaping responsibility on
the ground that its action is political and not subject to review. The Supreme Court, the final guardian and arbiter of
constitutional rights, must assume the burden of determining (if the theory of distinction between "amendment" and
"revision" now considered be sound) at what point the legislative method is no longer required and a convention can
properly commence to function.
This difficulty was clearly in the minds of the Judges in
1883. Their opinion disposed of the question by holding that
since, under the Federal Constitution, a Republican form of
Government was guaranteed, and since the great principles
established by the Bill of Rights and the separation of powers into three departments must unquestionably form a p a r t
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of any new, as well as of the old, constitution, such changes
as might be considered proper would all necessarily fall into
the class of amendments; and that for this reason, among
others, the legislative method prescribed by the Constitution
was the only one which could constitutionally be followed in
altering the fundamental law.
The Court was right. The words "amend" and "revise"
are not words of a r t or science. They are not susceptible of
such close definition t h a t it is possible to determine with
legal accuracy where one leaves off and the other begins. It
is the old Greek philosophical problem of the "heap." They
used to pour out a few particles of sand and ask whether
there was yet a heap. If the answer was "No" they would
add grains until someone said "Heap," whereupon they
would take away one grain of sand, and ask why it had
ceased to be a heap. So here. Particular amendments can be
added until someone says "Now you are making a revision,"
and you can remove one amendment and ask why it has
ceased to be a revision and is only a group of amendments.
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary we find "AMENDMENT. In
legislation. An alteration or change of something proposed
in a bill or established as law." Bouvier does not define
either "revision" or "revise."
Century Dictionary,
"amend" as follows:

among

other

definitions, defines

"To make a change or changes in the form of, as a
bill or motion, or a constitution; properly, to improve
in expression or detail, but, by usage, to alter, either in
construction, purport or principle."
"AMENDMENT.
3. In deliberative assemblies.
An
alteration proposed to be made in the draft of a bill or
in the terms of a motion under discussion. Any such
alteration is termed an amendment, even when its effect
is entirely to reverse the sense of the original bill or
motion.
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"4. An alteration of a legislative or deliberative act
or in a constitution; a change made in a law either by
way of correction or addition."
Ibid. " R E V I S E . 1. To look carefully over with a
view to correction. . . .
"2. To amend; bring into conformity with present
needs and circumstances; reform, especially by public
or official action." (Italics ours.)
Ibid. "REVISION. 1. The act of revision; re-examination and correction; as the revision of statistics;
the revision of a book, of a creed, etc."
It will be noted that there is no possibility of clear distinction between the terms, that "amendment" carries the
generic meaning of change or alteration, and that one of
the definitions of "revise" is "amend."
The constitutional rights of the people ought not to be
dependent upon such elusive shades of meaning, with respect
to which the best minds may honestly be in grave doubt. The
law, especially the fundamental law, ought not to be involved in a great mystery—it should be simple, plain and
straightforward, with rights and duties fully and plainly
set forth.
The opposite view results in a conclusion which is at least
surprising, not to say absurd. I t is insisted upon the other
side (1) that the people have a perpetual and inalienable
right at any time to make or remake their Constitution without regard to previous constitutional limitations. (2) I t is
conceded, however, that with respect to "amendments" the
constitutional method must be followed, i. e., approved by
two legislatures and ratification by a three-fifths vote of the
people. Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 573.
But, by hypothesis, "amendments" are considered less
sweeping and of relatively less consequence than "revisions."
I t may therefore be asked, why have the people power to do
the most important thing, but have no power to do the less
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important thing? On all principles of logic it would be supposed that the greater includes the less; but not so under the
theory now being considered. The people must follow the
legislative mode, involving the expiration of two years before
they can make a minor amendment to their Constitution,
but, it is insisted by our opponents, can sweep away in its
entirety the old constitutional fabric within a few weeks.
The whole difficulty, in this respect, arises from the assumption that a precise and scientific distinction can be
made between terms which in themselves are not precise or
scientific, and the consequent effort to make the most fundamental rights of sovereignty turn upon the distinction thus
attempted to be made. The conclusions to be drawn under
that theory must always be confused and vague because the
factors involved in the problem are themselves indeterminate. It was doubtless for this very sound reason that the
makers of our present system specified one distinct and practicable method by which amendments were to be proposed
and adopted or rejected, a method nicely calculated to allow
ample time and careful deliberation before fundamental
rights were affected, and to make certain that the result attained represented the permanent views of the electorate and
not those of a possibly transient majority. As the Court well
said:
"The object was not to hamper or baffle the popular
will, but to insure its full expression. Our ancestors
knew what we all know, that in spite of all precaution
a majority may be worked up for an occasion which is
not the true and permanent majority. They also knew,
what we all know, that many electors, perfectly satisfied
with the existing state of things, stay away from the
polls on Election Day from mere inertness of temperament. I t is inconceivable to us that they would have
elaborated so guarded a mode of amendment, unless
they had intended to have it exclusive and controlling."
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And certainly, where a clear, distinct, practicable, and
elaborate method of amendment is plainly set forth in the
instrument itself, it is nothing but common sense to conclude
that that method, and that method only, was the one intended to be adopted if changes, whether of "amendment" or of
"revision," were to be undertaken. Insofar as a distinction
may be taken between the two expressions, then certainly
deliberation, debate, reflection, and calm consideration are
more important where changes are to be sweeping than
where they are in matters of form or detail.

E. Analysis of Opposing Views
1. Answer to the Brief of the Twenty-six Lawyers.
As above stated, some ten years ago a memorandum in the
form of a brief was prepared and signed by twenty-six prominent attorneys, all leaders in the Democratic Party, entitled "A Constitutional Convention in Rhode Island,"
strongly criticising the opinion of the Rhode Island Court
in 1883, and upholding the convention method of amendment. Among its signers were the present Governor, Hon.
William W. Moss, now a member of this Court, and Hon.
Patrick H. Quinn and Hon. Thomas F. Cooney, of counsel in
this case. As that brief appears to have been carefully prepared, it will be proper to examine the points advanced
therein.

(i) Section 1, Article I, is to be construed in connection
with Article XIII.
By f a r the greatest emphasis is laid upon the proper interpretation of the first part of Section 1 of Article I, in which
is stated "The right of the people to make and alter their
constitutions of government," but considerably less attention is paid to the balance of this Section, which provides,
"but that the Constitution which at any time exists, till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people,
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is sacredly obligatory upon all." The brief argues that this
Section enunciates a "fundamental principle . . . namely that
the people of the several States of the American Union retain
sovereign power," subject only to the provisions of the Federal Constitution. That principle has often been stated; but
the retention of sovereign power is quite consistent in the
formation of the social compact with a binding statement of
the terms upon which that power is to be exercised.

(ii) Nature of Constitution and authorities thereon.
What is a Constitution? I t is the fundamental law of
government, and government is a compact between the whole
people and each individual; and between each individual and
the whole people, and whereby the whole people agree to
protect the rights of the individual and the individual agrees
to give to the government of the whole people the measure of
support which they may require within the limitations of the
Constitution. And each individual who remains or comes
under the operation of the Constitution is conclusively presumed to have assented to the terms of this compact. Therefore, neither party to this governmental compact is a t liberty to break the contract without the assent of the other.
(The foregoing and succeeding definitions and quotations
are, in substance, taken from Mr. Sheffield's monograph.)
Rousseau says that
"The social compact can be formed only by unanimous consent, because the rule itself that a majority
of votes shall prevail can only be established by agreement, that is by compact."
Henry Clay, speaking of Rhode Island affairs in 1842, said,
"How is this right of the people to abolish an existing
government and to set up a new one to be practically
exercised? Who are the people that are to tear up the
whole fabric of human society whenever and as often
as caprice or passion may prompt them? When all the
arrangements and ordinances of existing and organized
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society are prostrated and subverted . . .
all the
offspring of positive institutions are cast down and
abolished and society is thrown into one heterogeneous
and unregulated mass. . . . As often and wherever
society can be drummed up and thrown into such a
shapeless mass, the major p a r t of it may establish another, and another new government in endless success.
Why, this would overturn all social organizations, make
revolution—the extreme and last resort of an oppressed
people—the commonest occurrence of human life and
the standing order of the day."
John C. Calhoun said that only in civil society are majorities and minorities known to have any rights. Those
rights are political and derived from agreement or a compact. How absurd it is then to suppose that the right of a
majority to alter or abolish the Constitution is a natural
right. The right of altering or changing a Constitution is a
conventional right belonging to the body politic and subject
to be regulated by it.
Mr. Madison in the Federalist No. 43 says,
"A faction is a majority or minority of the whole
who are united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion or interest, adverse to the rights of the other
citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interest of
the community."
And in Federalist No. 51 he said,
"In a society under the forms of which the stronger
factions unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as
truly be said to exist as in a state of nature."
And, by Chancellor Kent,
"The Constitution is the act of the people speaking
in their original character and defining the permanent
conditions of the social alliance."
In 1790, Madison wrote to Jefferson as follows:
"On what principle is it that the voice of the majority
binds the minority? It does not result, I conceive,
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from a law of nature but from a compact founded on
utility. A greater proportion might be required by the
fundamental constitution of society, if under any particular circumstances it were judged eligible. Prior,
therefore, to the establishment of this principle,
unanimity was necessary, and rigid theory accordingly
presupposes the assent of every individual to the rule
which subjects the minority to the will of the majority."
Curtis, in his History of the Federal Constitution, says
(Volume 2, Page 474),
"The existence and operation of a prescribed method
of changing particular features of a government mark
the line between amendment and revolution, and render
a resort to the latter, for the purpose of melioration or
reform save in extreme cases of oppression unnecessary.
According to our American theory of government, revolution and amendment both rest upon the doctrine that
the people are the source of political power, and each
of them is the exercise of an ultimate right. But this
right is exercised in the process of amendment in a
prescribed form which preserves the continuity of the
existing government, and changes only such of its
fundamental rules as require revision without the destruction of any public or private rights that may have
become vested under the former rule. Revolution, on
the contrary, proceeds without form, is the violent disruption of the obligations resting on the authority of
the former government, and terminates its existence
often without saving any of the rights which may have
grown up under it. . . . Without an ascertained and
limited proceeding (in amending the Constitution) all
change becomes in effect revolutionary. . . ."
And Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations", says (page 30)
that "the people" is the body of electors created under the
Constitution, and even they can amend the Constitution only
by legitimate modes, which must either be prescribed in the
Constitution, or, in the absence of a prescribed mode, by authority of a law making power.
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In his History of Michigan, page 345, he says that,
"The written instrument comes into existence with
the understanding and purpose that its several paragraphs and provisions shall mean forever exactly what
they mean when adopted; and if a change is to take
place in the Constitution it must be brought about by
the steps which in the instrument itself are provided
for."
The Iowa Court in Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la. 543,
said that,
" I t matters not if not only every elector, but every
adult person in the State should desire and vote for an
amendment to the Constitution, it cannot be recognized
as valid unless such vote was held in pursuance of,
and in substantial accord with the requirements of the
Constitution."

(iii) The people can and often do voluntarily place
limitations upon the exercise of their sovereign power.
This principle is worthy of a little more consideration
since it is believed that at this point the opposing view is
derived from assumptions which are in truth unfounded.
Our adversaries iterate and reiterate that it is the people—
the people—who are to rule and that if a majority of them
(apparently meaning the electors) manifest a desire for
change in the fundamental law, the change at once becomes
rightful and constitutional. Perhaps the authorities above
mentioned sufficiently meet this position, but let us approach
it for a moment on principle.
Mr. Sheffield gives the illuminating example of twelve
castaways upon a desert island, starting in a state of nature
and without law. Have seven of them a natural right to
impose their will upon the remaining five? Can they lawfully and rightfully enact that all the work of the community shall be done by the five, and would there be any-
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thing unlawful in the minority withdrawing to another part
of the island to live as they chose? The answer is obvious.
In such circumstances the majority has no legal rights. If
they govern, it is either by force or because the five agree
or acquiesce. B u t if the twelve agree then you have an organized society ruled by law, which cannot be lawfully
changed without the assent of the minority and according
to the rules laid down. True, the majority rules, but it
rules in accordance with limitations, voluntarily submitted
to by the majority, for the benefit of all; and legal change
cannot thereafter be made except in accordance with the
compact.
The remarks of Daniel Webster in the case of Luther vs.
Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849) are often quoted by the proponents
of the other view. As Judge Durfee in his monograph
points out, however, (page 52) Mr. Webster in that case
was an advocate whose purpose was to show that it had
been the practice of the people of the several States to pass
a statute leading to a constitutional change before making
it, t. e., he was endeavoring to discredit the Dorr movement,
and was using the State of New York as the most recent
example, being one where a constitutional convention had
been called pursuant to an act of the legislature. He was
not considering whether that statute was constitutional. In
his works, however, he spoke more closely to the point.
Judge Durfee quotes him as follows:
" I t is one principle of the American system that the
people limit their governments, national and state.
They do so; but it is another principle, equally true and
certain, and, according to my judgment of things, equally important, that the people often limit themselves.
They set bounds to their own power. They have chosen
to secure the institutions which they establish against
the sudden impulses of mere majorities. All our institutions teem with instances of this. It was their
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great conservative principle, in constituting forms of
government, that they should secure what they had
established against hasty changes by simple majorities."
So, under the Federal Constitution, it requires the application of legislatures of two-thirds of the States to call a
convention, and amendments proposed in any mode must
be ratified by legislatures or conventions of three-fourths
of the States.
"The fifth article of the constitution, if it was made
a topic for those who framed 'the people's convention'
of Rhode Island, could only have been a matter of reproach. I t gives no countenance to any of these proceedings or to anything like them. On the contrary, it
is one remarkable instance of the enactment and application of that great American principle, that the constitution of government should be cautiously and prudently interfered with, and that changes should not
ordinarily be begun and carried through by bare majorities."
A perfect example of the voluntary limitation of the
power of majorities is found in the United States Constitution itself. Under it the States granted constitutional powers to the Federal Government, effective when adopted by
nine States. Under that Constitution, however, changes
may be made and sovereignty resumed by the States, not by
the act of a majority, but by the act of three-fourths of the
States which have thus joined together, acting either
through conventions or through the legislatures. The exercise of the ultimate sovereignty of the United States is
vested, therefore, not in the majority of the people or a majority of the States, but absolutely and solely in threefourths of the States. How, then, can it be said that a mere
majority necessarily have the reserved right to change the
Constitution at any moment?
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I t seems clear that one of the primary purposes of a Constitution is to preserve the rights of the minority against
the majority until changes are made in the mode provided
by the compact itself. Of what use is a Constitution to a
minority if it can be changed at any time at the whim of a
bare majority? If so, as Mr. Clay points out, it is subject
to frequent and capricious change, always leading to the
possibility of the destruction of all the rights which have
grown u p under it. If changed otherwise we are driven to
the conclusion that it is a revolutionary and not a constitutional alteration. And Section 1 itself solemnly enacts
that "the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed
by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is
sacredly obligatory upon all." W h a t is an explicit and authentic act of the whole people? I t is submitted that to be
constitutionally explicit it must be constitutionally expressed ; and t h a t to be authentic it must both be legal and
be duly and legally authenticated or evidenced. But in our
Constitution, the mode by which it is to be made explicit and
authentic is expressed in only one place and in only one
mode, and t h a t is in accordance with Article X I I I .

(iv) Section 10 of Article IV of the Constitution is subject to the implied prohibition of Article XIII.
It is further claimed upon the other side that since Section 10 of Article IV continues in the General Assembly
"the powers they have heretofore exercised," and since, prior
to 1842, the legislature called several conventions, that power is preserved to it by the Constitution. This claim, however, t u r n s out to be a mere restatement of the original
question; for the same Section 10 preserves the powers of
the Assembly, by its terms, subject to an express limitation,
i. e., "unless prohibited in this Constitution"; and, as already demonstrated, and as so ably set forth by Judge Dur-
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fee and Mr. Sheffield, the power to call a convention is, in
fact, necessarily, though impliedly, prohibited by considering Article X I I I in connection with Article I, Section 1.
That such prohibition exists would appear established by
the unbroken usage of ninety-two years and by the invariable adoption of the method of amendment prescribed in
Article X I I I .
This matter of implied prohibition is one which our opponents do not concede. In the brief of the Twenty-Six
Lawyers above mentioned, the ground is repeatedly taken
t h a t while the grant of an ordinary power may and usually
does imply the denial of any other power, as, for example,
in a deed, mortgage or will, such implication is not to be
made in construing the provisions of a Constitution, because
that is formulated by the sovereign power, against which
no implications are to be made. That the grant of a constitutional power may imply the denial of another clearly
appears, however, from a consideration of several instances.
The precise point has been before our Supreme Court, among
others, In re Opinion of the Supreme Court upon the Act
passed by the General Assembly at its J a n u a r y Session, 1854,
Reversing and Annulling the Judgment against Thomas W.
Dorr, 3 R. I. 299, and also in Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324.
The Dorr case dealt with an Act of the Assembly purporting to annul the judgment of the Supreme Court for
treason rendered against Thomas W. Dorr. The Constitution, by Article I I I , provided "The powers of the government shall be distributed in three departments; the legislative, executive, and judicial." I t will be noted that this
is an affirmative delegation of power. From it, however,
the Court implied a negative, holding that since the judicial
power was separate from the legislative, the legislative did
not have the judicial power assumed by it in the passage
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of this Act, and declared the Act unconstitutional, with the
words
"The power exclusively conferred upon the one department is, by necessary implication, denied to the
other. The Courts, therefore, cannot enact laws.
Their power is to judge and determine, to declare what
the law at any time is, not what it ought to be or shall
be" (p. 301).
F o r the same reason the General Assembly cannot rightfully exercise the judicial power. That is conferred upon
the Courts and necessarily prohibited to the General Assembly.
There, as here, it was claimed that judicial power continued in the Assembly under Section 10 of Article IV—
inasmuch as judicial powers, prior to the Constitution, had
customarily been exercised by the Assembly. I t was held
that the implied prohibition was, nevertheless, effective.
And in line with our argument above as to the authority
and weight attaching to a construction long accepted, the
Court in the Dorr case also had this to say:
"If the practice of the General Assembly, down to
the adoption of the Constitution, had been to exercise
such a jurisdiction, and such practice has been discontinued since, it is fair to presume it was discontinued
because inconsistent with that instrument." (3 R. I.
at 308.)
Similarly here. Since the Assembly has not once since
1843 passed an Act to call a constitutional convention, although calling four of them prior to adoption of the Constitution, "it is fair to presume that it (the practice) was
discontinued because inconsistent with that instrument."
As the Court, however, by dictum, recognized the propriety of a portion of the judicial functions of the Assembly,
the matter came up again and was finally settled by the
opinion of Chief Justice Ames in Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I.
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324. In a lengthy and profound opinion he flatly held t h a t
from and after the adoption of the Constitution all judicial
powers were by implication prohibited to the General Assembly, saying that the provisions of Section 10 of Article
IV that "The General Assembly shall continue to exercise
the powers they have heretofore exercised unless prohibited
in this Constitution" did not justify the exercise! of judicial
powers, since those are expressly vested by the Constitution
in the Supreme and inferior Courts; which, by necessary
implication, prevents their exercise by the legislative department. He f u r t h e r holds that the expressed distribution of powers is "for the purpose of preventing each department from exercising those appropriate to the others."
At page 361 he emphasizes
"That in matters of doubtful interpretation, the long
continued practice of the other departments of the government, acquiesced in by the people, under such an instrument, is often properly resorted to by the Courts,
for the purpose of ascertaining its meaning; and even
the authentic debates of the body which framed the
Constitution have, though with caution, been used in
such matters for the same purpose."
In that connection at this point it is perhaps proper to
refer to the fact that an amendment was actually proposed
in the convention which adopted our Constitution by Mr.
Ennis to Section 1 of Article I, which was rejected.
That
amendment would have made the first Section substantially
identical with that of Pennsylvania, the dicta of two opinions from which have been much relied upon in opposition
to our contention. Mr. Ennis's rejected amendment to Section 1 read as follows:
"Section First. All political power and sovereignty
are originally vested in and of right belong to the people. All free governments are founded in their authority and are established for the greatest good of the whole
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number. The people have, therefore, an inalienable
and indefeasible right? in their original sovereignty and
unlimited capacity to alter, reform or totally change the
same whenever their safety or happiness requires." See
journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1842 in the
State archives under date of September 13, 1842.
But it is said on the other side that there is a distinction
between an implication against another branch of the government, such as the General Assembly, and an implication
against the sovereign; and that while the first may be proper
(Taylor vs. Place), the second is out of order, i. e. that no
implication by affirmative words can arise against the sovereign, i. e. the State or people.
That the asserted distinction is unsupportable both in
theory and in practice is ably pointed out by Judge Durfee
in his monograph. By hypothesis, and as established in
Taylor vs. Place (supra), an implication can arise against
a department of the government, e. g. the legislative, which
is not the sovereign but a creature and delegate of the sovereign. And whether or not an implication can arise
against the sovereign is logically not here material, for it is
the General Assembly which is contemplated as the body
assuming to call a constitutional convention, and not the
people; so that the doctrine of implied prohibition still applies with full force against action by the legislative department in taking steps to alter the Constitution, which created
it, otherwise than in the constitutional mode prescribed.
And that implied prohibitions can be, and have been made
against the sovereign is demonstrated, among other instances, in connection with the unlawful and unconstitutional secession of the Southern States in 1861. By the
Constitution, they had conferred definite and limited powers
upon the United States, and had expressly declared that all
powers not so conferred or enumerated were reserved to the
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respective states or to the people. I t was not stated that
the sovereign states could not secede. Everyone knows the
answer. The Civil W a r decided the question, and the Supreme and State Courts have repeatedly adjudicated that
secession was unconstitutional, and that a necessary implication arose from the power granted to the Federal Government that that power should not, without the consent of
the United States, be revested in the respective sovereign
states. That would appear to dispose once and for all of
the theory that implications against the sovereign cannot
be derived from an affirmatively granted power.
In the brief of the Twenty-Six Lawyers, a good deal is
made of the point that in two cases decided after the rendition of the Opinion of the Justices in 1883, our Court found
it proper to distinguish between the principles then applied
and those which were effective in the cases in question. The
argument is somewhat labored and need not be taken up in
detail. What we desire to emphasize, however, in each of
them is this: Each was an adjudicated case involving a judicial decision, and in each the Court referred with approval
to its Opinion as rendered to the Senate in 1883.
State vs. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 (1886);
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors of Pawtucket,
(1905).

27 R. I. 401

It does not appear to us of great moment or to be a ground
of adversary criticism that the Court distinguished those
cases from the Opinion. Surely an earlier opinion can be
distinguished from a later one without impairing its value
as a precedent. I t is done every day. The real fact which
is important, and which cannot be escaped, is that in two
adjudicated cases the views expressed in the opinion Re
Convention in 14 R. I. have been expressly approved and
reaffirmed.
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In t h a t brief or memorandum of the Twenty-Six Lawyers
are repeated the arguments made originally by Judge Bradley and Abraham Payne in their pamphlets published in
1885 ("The Methods of Changing the Constitution of the
States, especially that of Rhode Island") that in a substantial number of States whose Constitutions, generally speaking have provisions for amendment in the legislative mode
but are silent with respect to amending through constitutional conventions, conventions have nevertheless been
called, and have submitted to the people new or revised Constitutions which have been adopted. The same point is emphasized by certain text writers who deal with this matter,
e. g. Jameson on Constitutional
Conventions, 4th Ed. Sections 573, 574, where he criticizes the opinion of the Rhode
Island Court. See also Hoar "Constitutional Conventions,
Their Nature, Powers and Limitations " pages 46-66.
The fact is freely conceded: the legal inferences remain
unchanged. While the instances mentioned are precedents
as respects what has been done politically, they are without
weight as judicial authorities, and ought not to affect the
opinion of a judicial tribunal which is asked what can lawfully be done. All of such changes, in our opinion, were
in their nature revolutionary and extra-legal, that is to say
unconstitutional. Of course, if a political act of that type
takes place, if the people by a majority purport to adopt
a new Constitution so submitted, if a system of government
is organized thereunder, and Courts are established or continued in pursuance of its provisions, it is idle, short of a
resort to arms, to contend that the new government is without force in law or under the Constitution. No court can
properly attack the government or Constitution of which
it is the creature, and such attacks are therefore not made.
This principle is illustrated by Taylor vs. Commonwealth,
301 Va. 829 (1903). A constitutional convention was called
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by a direct vote of the people and itself framed and adopted
a Constitution without submitting it to the people for ratification. The government was organized and acted upon under the new Constitution, which was proclaimed by the Governor as directed therein. I t was recognized by the General
Assembly, and the judiciary took oath thereunder. The
Court found that it had been acquiesced in by the people
by peacefully accepting it and registering as voters thereunder. Under it the defendant was found guilty of felony
without trial by jury, and he challenged the constitutionality of the new instrument. The Court held t h a t as a matter
of fact the new Constitution was in force throughout the
State
"and there being no government in existence under the
previous Constitution, opposing or denying its validity,
we have no difficulty in holding that the Constitution
in question . . . is the only rightful, valid and existing Constitution of this State."
The Court did not pass upon the question as to whether
the convention was without power to promulgate the Constitution, for which it gave two reasons. (1) Because there
was no library available in which it could investigate the
question. (2) That even if the convention was without legal
power it would not change the result of this case, i. e., the
Court being itself the creature of the new "Constitution"
felt that it could not question the validity of the instrument
under which it itself was acting. The case has weight only
as recognizing a political as distinguished from a constitutional or legal principle.
See to the same effect Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613,
708. There are a number of other cases which express the
same view.
But, again as Judge Durfee said in his monograph, while
such instances are pertinent he does not value them as
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precedents because (1) we are not told how often such
changes have been rejected, when proposed, because unconstitutional; (2) the Constitutions of the several States have
their differences as well as their resemblances, and what is
wrong under one may be right under another; (3) the special provision. Article X I I I , which is so clearly mandatory
in our Constitution may be less clearly so in another, or it
may be accompanied by some other clause which countervails its restrictive effect; (4) if the declaratory clause,
which was offered and rejected in the convention which
framed our Constitution (see supra, p. 42, Ennis amendment) had been adopted, we might, find it more difficult to
maintain that the special provision (Article X I I I ) is exclusive and controlling; and (5) as to certain cases which
are substantially similar to ours on the political side, Judge
Durfee has this to say:
"That the legislature of no other state can decide for
the people of Rhode Island what is the meaning of their
Constitution, or absolve them from their duty to support and obey it according to the meaning which it has
in Rhode Island. A legislative precedent is not like a
judicial precedent, for legislatures give no reasons for
their decisions, and we cannot know what arguments
or influences may have prevailed with them. . . . A
legislature is not generally well fitted to decide legal
or constitutional questions."

F. No Judicial Decision Has Been Found
Contrary to Our Position
We are in no wise disturbed because certain textwriters have shown an inclination to criticise the Opinion
of the Justices of 1883. Jameson, Dodd and Hoar rely for
their position upon the fact that the Legislatures of a number of other states have assumed to call constitutional conventions where the constitutions of those states were silent
as to the existence of such power, and where a legislative
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mode of amendment was provided. That argument appears
sufficiently met by the observations of Judge Durfee above
alluded to. They are political and not judicial precedents.
Dodd refers to only three cases in support of his position
and himself describes those cases as dicta upon the point.
THE

REVISION AND A M E N D M E N T

OF STATE

CONSTITUTIONS,

page 46.
And we may as well say here that notwithstanding the
great extent of the discussion upon the subject and the very
lengthy period of time during which that discussion has
taken place, we find nowhere in the whole range of the discussion, and our own researches have not produced, a single
judicial decision contrary to the opinion of the Justices,
upon the question before us here. There are a number of
obiter dicta not necessary to recorded decisions, and much
is made of them by text-writers and proponents of the opposing view. It seems unfortunate, but inevitable, that
courts—even the ablest—when presented with constitutional
questions, have so often thought it necessary in their opinions to explore large areas in the constitutional field in no
way involved with the precise questions at issue. That
Judge Durfee and Judge Shaw in the Rhode Island and
Massachusetts cases, respectively, were able to restrict
themselves to profound, comprehensive, yet brief decisions
of the points before them, is but another instance of their
preeminent ability.

G. Even Were It Otherwise, Rhode Island Should
Maintain Its Own Established Position
But even though certain text-writers hold with the political practice which has in the past obtained in a few of our
sister states, we repeat that we are quite willing to be considered "peculiar" by those authorities. I t is not the first
time that Rhode Island has at the same time been both "dif-
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ferent" and right—indeed, that is our chief claim to an
enduring place in history.
The state was founded by a reformer who found himself
at odds with the viewpoint of all of his neighbors in Massachusetts. I t made him great. The state broke new ground
in America in establishing its fundamental principle recognized in the Royal Charter that
"no person within the said colony at any time hereafter
shall be in any wise molested, punished, disquieted or
called in question for any differences in opinion in matters of religion";
which also contained the declaration of the founders that
it was much on their hearts
"to hold forth a lively experiment that a most flourishing civil state may stand and best be maintained, and
that among our English subjects, with a full liberty of
religious concernments."
This was, for the time, peculiar—it has become our chief
claim to fame and the admiration of posterity.
We were the first to declare our independence of Great
Britain—the last to subscribe to the United States Constitution ; the last, also, of the original colonies to adopt
our own Constitution. More recently, when prohibition
was the burning issue, we were one of the two states which,
alone among the forty-eight, declined and continued to decline to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Our judgment has been confirmed by its recent repeal. In the light of our history and experience,
therefore, we need not be too much concerned that a few
states have taken political action contrary to our own tradition, nor that certain (but not all—nor the greatest) individual text-writers feel that the political precedents thus
established impugn the soundness of the views of our own
Supreme Court and of most of our leading statesmen before
and at that time.
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H. Analysis of Authorities Cited

Contra

We have said that our researches have produced no opposing judicial decisions. Let us look at the cases which
have been, or may be, referred to on the other side. Dodd
refers to Wells vs. Bain and Wood's Appeal, in Pennsylvania, and Collier vs. Frierson, in Alabama, all of which he
concedes to be dicta only.
1.

Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39 (1874).

In that case two points, and two points only, were before
or decided by the Court: (1) As to whether, when the legislative act providing for the calling of the Constitutional
Convention designated that the election to be held thereunder should be conducted by the regular statutory election
officials, it was competent for the Convention to provide that,
in the City of Philadelphia, the election should be conducted
under the supervision of their own appointees. The Court's
answer was "No." (2) The act calling the Convention provided that upon the request of one-third of the delegates,
any proposed article should be voted upon separately by
the people. There was some evidence that a request had
been made to vote on the article relating to the judiciary
department by one-third of the Convention. The Court
held, however, that this was a procedural matter in the Convention and it might be presumed that it acted in accordance with its authority. I t is true that in its opinion the
Court announced that there were
"three known recognized modes by which the whole people, the state, can give their consent to an alteration
of an existing lawful frame of government, viz.:
"1. The mode provided in the existing Constitution.
"2. A law as the instrumental process of raising the
body for revision and conveying to it the powers of
the people.
"3. A revolution."
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It will be observed that the Court said, "recognized modes,"
not "constitutional modes." I t could not have meant the
latter because one of the modes mentioned was "revolution."
It also emphasized the declaration of rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution, which is substantially broader than
ours ("have a t all times an inalienable and indefeasible
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such a
manner as they may think proper"), which is in line with
the rejected form submitted here by Mr. Ennis (supra,
p. 42). And the Court further said that
"the people here meant the whole—those who constitute the entire state, male and female citizens, infants
and adults. A mere majority of those persons who
are qualified as electors are not the people, though when
authorized to do so they may represent the whole
people."
None of the above argument, whether it be for or against
the position we maintain, was, as we have demonstrated,
anything more than dictum.
2. Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59 (1874.)
This was a proceeding by certain citizens to enjoin State
officials from holding a general election to pass upon a proposed Constitution prepared by a constitutional convention.
In 1871 the legislature submitted to the people the question
whether such a convention should be called, and the popular
vote was affirmative. An act of 1872 provided for the election of delegates accordingly, with a proviso for submission
to the people of any Constitution adopted by the convention.
Petitioners argued that the act of 1871 was invalid and that
therefore the convention was not a legal body. The Constitution provided a different method for its amendment
along the lines of Article X I I I of the Rhode Island Constitution, but included a Bill of Rights similar to that proposed here by Mr. Ennis and rejected by our convention in
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1842. The Court held the act of 1871 valid and refused the
injunction, stating that
"The calling of a convention and regulating its action
by law is not forbidden in the Constitution."
The lower Court, the decision of which was affirmed on
appeal, relied upon the statement of Mr. Webster
" 'That of the old thirteen States, their Constitutions,
with one exception, contain no provision for an amendment, yet there is hardly one that has not altered its
Constitution and it has been done by conventions called
by the legislature as an ordinary exercise of power' " ;
and further observes that
"in view of the foregoing it would seem that the question as to whether the calling of a constitutional convention was a legal exercise of power by the legislature
should now be considered by all judicial tribunals as
settled so firmly as a part of the common law of our
government that any attempt to disturb it at this day
would savor more of revolution than legitimacy. He
would be bold indeed who would now assert that all
those conventions were usurpations and that all the
Constitutions proposed by them and adopted by the
people were revolutionary."
I t will be observed that the foregoing was quite outside
the scope of the actual decision. The question before the
Court was not, as here, whether the legislature could call a
convention, but whether it had acted lawfully in submitting
to the people the question whether such a convention should
be called—which is no part of the matter now before this
Court. I t is f u r t h e r to be observed that the Court cites
only political precedents and not judicial ones. Still more
important, that the instances of political action upon which
it relies are those in which the Constitutions of the original
States "contained no provision for their own amendment"—
a situation readily distinguishable from that before the
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Pennsylvania Court, or now before this Court. If boldness
be required to assert that, in the absence of amendatory
provision in a Constitution, the adoption of a new one by
the conventional method is, in its essence and theory, revolutionary, we have the hardihood to make that exact assertion ; and for it we have the support of Chief Justice Durfee
and of many statesmen and authorities elsewhere referred to
in this brief. It comes only to this,—the breach of a social
compact contrary to its fair meaning is or is not outside
the law. The compact being the supreme law of the land,
its breach is outside the law and is therefore in its nature
a change imposed by force and not by law, i. e., revolutionary.
3.

Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100 (1854).

The sole question in this case was whether a constitutional
amendment proposed in the mode specified in the Constitution for its own amendment had been properly adopted.
The court held that it had not, because the proposed amendment was not properly ratified at the second session of the
General Assembly; and therefore did not satisfy the constitutional requirements which were similar to our Article
XIII.
The Court, however, by way of dictum, said that the Alabama Constitution could be amended either by the people
who originally framed it or in the mode prescribed by the
instrument itself, saying,
"We entertain no doubt that to change the Constitution in any other mode than by convention, every
requisite which is demanded by the instrument itself
must be observed, and the omission of any one is fatal
to the amendment."
The expressions quoted are obviously unnecessary to the
decision and can have no weight against the Opinion of our
Supreme Court.
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We should, refer also to two other cases which have been
cited by the proponents of the other view. The first is,
(a) State vs. Taylor, 22 N. D. 362 (1911).
This case has special interest because it accords with our
position as to the logical impossibility of distinguishing between "amendment" and "revision". A constitutional
amendment was proposed and adopted, apparently in accordance with the method prescribed in the Constitution
itself, but the Constitution carried a clause that additional
public institutions in the State should not be established
"without a revision of this Constitution". I t was claimed
by petitioners for an injunction that the provision for
"amendment" did not authorize a "revision", and that therefore no revision had taken place, since "revision" is a change
in the Constitution of such nature that it could be effected
only by means of a convention. But it was held that "revision" in the amendatory provisions included "amendment," i. e., that no general review or revision of the Constitution was necessary to make legal the action taken; and the
Court added that the word "amendment" was used in the
popular sense to embrace any form of change, alteration
or revision of the Constitution. So f a r the case is favorable. It does, however, contain a dictum to the following
effect:
" I t is also reasonably clear t h a t the body of the delegates failed to understand, what seems to be the consensus of authorities at the present time, that the legislative assembly has the inherent power to submit the
question of calling a constitutional convention to the
electors."
These expressions were quite beside the point before the
Court, and it is significant that the Court omitted to cite
the "authorities" who constituted the "consensus" mentioned. Doubtless it had in mind, not the judicial, but the
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political precedents so often relied upon by proponents of
the contrary view.
The other is
(b)

State vs. Dahl, 6. N. D. 81 (1896).

This case appears to hold that mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of State to proceed in accordance with a
joint resolution of the legislature recommending that at the
next general election the people should vote on whether a
constitutional convention should be held, although the conventional method of amendment was not expressly provided
for in the existing Constitution. The Court says that it is
"obvious" that the body which is vested with power to designate the question to be submitted to the people is the legislature. It is to be noted, however, that in the course of its
opinion, the Court considerably weakens the force of its own
position by holding that it is unnecessary for the Court to
decide the matter, saying
"It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on
the question whether Section 202 of the
Constitution,
prescribing the mode of amending the same, prevents
the lawful assembling of a constitutional
convention
in this State to revise the fundamental law. The decided weight, of authority and the more numerous
precedents are arrayed on the side of the doctrine
which supports the existence of this inherent legislative power to call a constitutional convention, notwithstanding the fact that the instrument itself points
out how it may be amended. See Jameson CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, Sections 570-574 D. But see In
Re Constitutional
Convention, 14 R. I. 649; Opinion
of Justices of Supreme Court, 6 Cush. 573."
It will be observed that the point before the Court was,
not the right of the Assembly to call a constitutional convention, but to submit to the people the question whether
such a convention should be called: and that the expressions
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quoted are merely dicta. I t is also proper to point out that
although the Court made the observation that the "decided
weight of authority" was with it, its citations hardly bear it
out. It cites in its favor one text writer, in opposition the
Opinions of two Supreme Courts. It appears difficult to
support the Court's statement relative to the "decided weight
of authority."
The brief of the Twenty-Six Lawyers cited also two cases
in Indiana as favoring their position. They appear to us
to support the conclusion for which we stand.
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 33G.
The Legislature itself prepared a series of amendments
to the Constitution which it proposed to submit to popular
vote. An injunction was sought against the officers designated to hold the election under the Act. The Court held
the Act void, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th
ed., 56, as follows:
" 'By the Constitution which they established they
not only tie up the hands of our official agencies, but
their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the
state nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are
at liberty to take action in opposition to the fundamental l a w . ' "
It further held that the Legislature has only delegated
power to pass laws in the nature of ordinary legislation under the Constitution, and that their legislation proposing
amendments was not such ordinary legislation. As fas as
the point actually decided is concerned, it appears strongly
to support our own position, but as the opinion contained
dicta to the effect that the Legislature had the right to call
a Convention, or at least to submit the question of calling
such a Convention to the people, it is cited in the brief of the
Twenty-Six Lawyers as supporting their argument.
In the same brief another recent Indiana case is cited
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which is even more strongly in favor of our position.
case is

That

Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533 (1917).
There the Constitution neither granted, nor in terms forbade, the Legislature to call a Constitutional Convention.
In 1913 the Assembly submitted to the electors the question
whether a Constitutional Convention should be called,
which was voted down by the people by a majority of more
than one hundred and three thousand. There had been no
subsequent poll upon the question. Thereafter, the Legislature passed an Act "to provide for the election of delegates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the State,"
and this case was a petition against state officials to declare
the Act void and to enjoin proceedings thereunder. The
Court held, by a majority of four to one, that the Act which
was challenged violated that part of the Bill of Rights
which gave to the people an indefeasible right to alter and
reform their government, particularly since the proposal for
a convention had previously been definitely rejected by the
people; that since it was conceded that the people had a
right to create a new Constitution, the only question was
one of method; that since the Legislature had no inherent
rights, it must justify its right to take the initiative in
calling a convention by a warrant for the same either in the
Constitution or directly from the people, saying:
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all
of the states of the Union where the Constitution itself
does not provide for the calling of the Constitutional
Convention, to ascertain, first, the will of the people
and to procure from them a commission to call such a
convention before the Legislature proceeds to do so.
The people being the repository of the right to alter or
reform its government, its will and wishes must be
consulted before the Legislature can proceed to call a
convention," citing, 6 R. C. L., Section 17, page 27;
Hoar, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, page 68 (1917).
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Great weight was attached to the people's previous rejection
of a proposal to call such a convention, and it was said that
this expression of the will of the people was deemed by the
court to be as binding on the General Assembly as a positive
provision of the
Constitution.
The dissenting opinion relies upon its interpretation of
Cooley, Dodd, Jameson and Hoar, but recognizes the rule
that
"when the Constitution provides that a power shall
be exercised in a particular manner, a failure to comply with the provisions of the Constitution in any
material respect will vitiate the Act, and the courts
have power to so declare, . . . if the framers of the
Constitution of 1851 had prescribed a plan to be followed, the Legislature would have been bound to follow the method thus prescribed; but where the Constitution prescribes no plan, the Court is powerless to
do so" (pp. 543, 551).
It will be noted that this case is directly contra to the position of our opponents. Here the question is not, "Has the
Legislature the power to submit to the people the question
whether a convention shall be called?" but, "Would it be a
valid exercise of the legislative power if the General Assembly
should provide by law (a) for a convention to be called to
revise or amend the Constitution of the State?" In Indiana
the answer was "No", particularly where (as here) the people had previously rejected the proposed amendment to authorize the Assembly to do that very thing. The case was
doubtless cited by the Twenty-Six Lawyers because in their
brief they were arguing, not for the calling of a convention
by the Legislature, but for the propriety of submitting that
question to the people for their determination. This is
almost definitely conceded at the end of the Twenty-Six
Lawyers' brief where they say:
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"In every given case all doubt could be resolved by
submitting to the people the question whether a convention should be held. If this should be done and
the vote be in favor of the convention, no objection
could be reasonably raised. And if a new constitution
were thus evolved, the changes would have been
effected in conformity with sound reason and American precedent. . . . The right of the people to hold
a convention ought not to be denied on the authority
of the Court's Opinion in 1883."
We need hardly say that we deny, with Judge Durfee, the
constitutional right of the General Assembly even to submit
to the people the question as to whether a convention should
be called; but that is not before the Court under the present
reference and need not be argued a t length. I t may be
pointed out, however, that even the opposing text-writers,
along with the twenty-six lawyers, appear to believe that
(assuming, but not conceding, that the convention method
is in any wise constitutional) the Legislature is still without power to go further than to submit the question of holding a convention to the people. But even if that should be
conceded to be the proper method, Question (a) must still
be answered "No", for that provides for the calling by the
Assembly and not for the submission of the question to the
people.
As a result of the foregoing review of authorities adversely cited, we again assert that although there are such
opposing dicta, and although there are certain political
precedents in which the action now contemplated has actually been taken in other States, there is not in the United
States one single judicial decision which has actually held
contrary to the Opinion of the Justices in Rhode Island of
1883 upon the point under discussion.
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I. Submission of Supporting Authorities
As authorities that that Opinion on the contrary was
sound and should be here reaffirmed, in addition to the
Opinion of the Justices in Massachusetts and Bennett vs.
Jackson (supra, pp. 24, 56), we refer to
State vs. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 (supra, p. 44) ;
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors, 27 R. I. 401 (supra,
p. 4 4 ) ;
State vs. City of New Orleans, 163 La. Ann. 777
(1927);
Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 l a . 541;
State ex re I. Stevenson vs. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391 (1887);
State vs. McBride, 4 Mo. 303 (1836) ;
Cooley. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th Ed. ( 1 9 2 7 ) .
No one of the cases above listed is exactly on all fours
with the Rhode Island case, but the inferences are clear.
State vs. City of New Orleans, 163 La. Ann. 777, 783
(1927)
(supra).
The question here was whether a certain act purported
to be an amendment to the State Constitution. I t was held
that it was not, but in the course of the opinion the Court
spoke as follows:
"The Constitution, by Section 1, Article 21 expressly
points out when and how amendments to the Constitution may be proposed and considered by the legislature
and adopted by a vote of the people when so submitted.
The manner of proposing and adopting amendments to
the Constitution as thus provided is exclusive. The
Constitution cannot be altered, changed, affected, or
amended in any other manner unless express and direct
permission is given to the legislature by the Constitution itself."
Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la. 541 (supra).
This case is elsewhere referred to (supra, p. 36) but
should also be mentioned again here. An amendment was
made by the legislative mode, except that differences de-
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veloped between the amendment as spread upon the Journal
of the House and that finally submitted to vote of the people.
The second opinion of the Chief Justice held that the Court
had power itself to examine the House Journal, and, a discrepancy being discovered, that the proposed amendment
was void, although it had been approved by a very large
majority of the electorate.
This holding is inconsistent with the theory that nothing
is required to amend or alter a Constitution except a majority vote of the qualified electors. From it it necessarily
follows that the expression of the popular will, to be effective, must be in the constitutional mode.
State ex rel. Stevenson vs. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391 (1887)
(supra).
The Nevada Constitution required that proposed amendments should be entered upon the Journal of the Assembly.
An amendment was proposed in the legislative mode without
compliance with this provision. It was, however, voted upon
by the people and received a substantial majority for adoption, but it was held that the amendment had not been constitutionally made, the Court saying:
"We conclude that amendments to the Constitution
can be made only in the mode provided by the instrument itself. * * * These provisions were intended to
secure care and deliberation on the part of the legislature and people and are exclusive and controlling"
(p. 396).
To precisely the same effect is
State vs. McBride, 4 Mo. 303 (1836)

{supra).

As above mentioned, Jameson, Dodd and Hoar are inclined
to criticise the Rhode Island rule. To them we oppose Cooley
on Constitutional Limitations.
In the field we are exploring,
no commentator stands higher, and this great work has for
generations been considered authoritative on subjects within
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its scope. In Chapter 3 of the Eighth Edition, at page 84,
the rule is stated as follows :
"In the original States and all others subsequently
admitted to the Union, the power to amend or revise
Constitutions resides in the great body of the people
as an organized body politic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source of all State authority,
have power to control and alter at will the law which
they have made. But the people, in the legal sense,
must be understood to be those who, by the existing
Constitution, are clothed with political rights, and who,
while that instrument remains, will be the sole organs
through which the will of the body politic can be expressed. * * *
"But the will of the people to this end can only be
expressed in the legitimate modes by which such a body
politic can act, and which must either be prescribed by
the Constitution whose revision or amendment is
sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the
State, which alone would be authorized to speak for
the people upon this subject, and to point out a mode
for the expression of their will in the absence of any
provisions for amendment or revision contained in the
Constitution itself "
And at page SI:
"The people of the Union created a national Constitution, and conferred upon it powers of sovereignty
over certain subjects, and the people of each State
created a State government, to exercise the remaining
powers of sovereignty so f a r as they were disposed to
allow them to be exercised a t all. By the
Constitution
which they establish, they not only tie up the hands
of their official agencies, but their own hands as well;
and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in
opposition to this fundamental law "
Our position could not be better stated.
All of our argument to this point has been upon the as-
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sumption that Question (a) is to be read as a part of a plan
or scheme of proposed constitutional revision, of which plan
all six questions are component and integral parts, i. e., that
Question (a) does not contemplate the possibility of a revision or amendment of the Constitution without the final submission to the people for their approval or rejection of any
Constitution which may be drafted in and approved by the
Convention.

J. If Question (a) Is a Separate and Independent Question, Then Even More Emphatically Its Answer Should
Be in the Negative.
If, however, each question is separate (and the questions
may be so interpreted by this Court), we are confronted by
an even more serious situation; for the apparent meaning of
Question ( a ) , considered by itself, is, Can the General Assembly provide by law for a convention "to revise or amend
the Constitution", i. e., if such a convention were to be called
by the General Assembly, can the convention itself adopt and
promulgate an amended or new constitution without any submission of the new instrument to the vote of the people?
It is perhaps needless to say that if that is the proper interpretation of the question (which we can hardly believe), in
our opinion the answer should be, "No". Not only everything
we have previously said in the brief, but everything in the
history of the state, in the Constitution, or in the Declaration
of Rights, as well as the arguments heretofore advanced even
by the critics of the opinion of the Justices, is against such
a result. A contrary position is in effect a flat negative of
the "right of the people to make and alter their constitutions
of government". It is still more in the teeth of the remainder of Section 1 of Article I, providing, "that the Constitution which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit
and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory
upon all".
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True, in two instances, it has been done elsewhere by political action—which emphasizes the caution with which political precedents are to be considered authoritative by the
Court. Virginia has done it (supra, p. 45), but the Supreme
Court of that State, although appointed and acting under
the provisions of the new Constitution, while admitting its
inability to impugn the authority under which it itself was
functioning, expressly declined to pass upon the validity of
the Constitution thus imposed upon the people.
Mississippi has done it. See,
Sproule vs. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 89S (1892).
The latter case, so f a r as we know, is the only one which
attempts to justify such a proceeding upon constitutional
principles. The opinion is in the nature of a deification of a
Constitutional Convention which is described as a
"sovereign body—the highest legislative body known to
free men in a representative government. I t is supreme
in its sphere. I t wields the powers of sovereignty especially delegated to it for the purpose. * » * The sole
limitation upon its powers is t h a t no change in the
form of government shall be done or attempted. The
spirit of Republicanism must breathe through every
part of the framework, but the particular fashioning of
the parts of the framework is confined to the wisdom,
the faithfulness, and the patriotism of this great convocation representing the people in their sovereignty.
# #
*" (p. 904).
There is much more in the same strain. I t is perhaps enough
to say that the Court of Mississippi stands alone in approving any such annihilation of the ultimate right of the people
to determine their own form of government. The general
and correct view of this type of proceeding is set forth in
Lobingier, "The People's Law", 1909, at pages 330-337. "V.
The Legal Necessity of Submission". To the same effect see,
among other cases,
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Carton vs. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337;
State vs. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429 (1926).
And even in Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59, upon which our
opponents particularly rely, it is held that the convention
could not take from the people their sovereign right to ratify
or reject the Constitution framed by the Convention.
Emphatically, there is no word or phrase in the Constitution of Rhode Island, and there is nothing in our history,
even during the turbulent days of the Dorr war, from which
it can be supposed that our fathers intended their liberties
thus to be placed at the mercy of an extra-constitutional body
of delegates selected by a Legislature elected without any
such mandate. If Question (a) is to be interpreted as contemplating any such catastrophe, it should unquestionably
be answered, "No." And for the sake of certainty and clearness upon a point vital to the safety of the Republic, we venture earnestly to suggest that i f , contrary to our contention,
this Court should feel that Question (a) should be answered
in the affirmative upon the assumption that it is a part of a
general plan contemplating and necessarily leading to the
submission of any new Constitution to the people, it should
take care that any such affirmative answer should be so qualified and limited that no one can suppose that a convention
so called would have original and final power itself to adopt,
promulgate and declare effective the results of its labors without submission to the whole people for their approval.

K. Summary of Point II
We summarize this point as follows:
1. A constitution is a social compact among all the people. I t is by its terms the supreme law of the state and therefore there can be no other law over it. I t is the delegation
of sovereign power to agents who can take no action, except
as specified therein, for its alteration or abolishment. Binding on both majority and minority, it can be legally changed
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only in accordance with its terms, except by a revolutionary
process, peaceable or otherwise, for what lies outside the constitutional provisions is no p a r t of the social compact, and
there is no natural legal right that the majority can impose
its will upon the minority.
2. Article I, Section 1, is to be read in connection with
Article X I I I , and the latter designates the explicit and authentic act of the whole people necessary for amendment or
revision.
3. These principles are supported by the entire history
of the Constitution:
(a) It is inconceivable that had the Convention
method been intended, it would not have been specifically
provided for.
(b) The method now proposed has never been attempted during the ninety-two years the Constitution
has been in effect.
(c) The constitutional method has been successfully
used twenty-one times, and has also been followed in all
cases where amendments were rejected.
(d) The people have themselves construed the Constitution upon the point by rejecting a proposal to
amend it in such manner as to permit use of the convention method, both through the mode of a direct call by
the Assembly, and that of submitting to the people the
question of holding such a convention.
(e) For over fifty years even the leaders of the opposing party have made no move and introduced no resolution providing for the direct call of a convention by
the General Assembly.
(f) The people have acquiesced in the position which
we now take.
4. The foregoing principles are not affected by Section 10
of Article IV for reasons both historic and logical, the legislative power in question having been impliedly prohibited by
the Constitution.
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5. This position is supported by the authority of our own
Supreme Court, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and
other cases, and there are no judicial decisions holding the
contrary.
6. A constitutional prohibition can be implied as well as
expressed, and is here necessarily implied.
7. Precedents of a political, but not of a judicial, nature
in other states are without judicial bearing.
8. If, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court should
consider that the General Assembly has power to call a Constitutional Convention, and should therefore answer Question (a) in the affirmative, the answer should be clearly
qualified so as to make it certain that no amendment or new
constitution can become effective unless approved by the
whole body of the people through their vote thereon upon the
legal submission thereof to them for that purpose.
9. The answer to Question (a) should therefore be in the
negative.

III. THE QUESTION OF THE LEGAL RIGHT OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO SUBMIT TO THE PEOPLE THE QUESTION, WHETHER A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION SHOULD BE CALLED, IS
NOT NOW BEFORE THE COURT.
It seems to us to be clear that as Question (a) asks whether
the General Assembly may provide by law for a Convention
to be called it cannot be interpreted to inquire whether the
Assembly can submit to the people the question whether a
Convention can be called, and we therefore do not go into
this question at length, as it is not now before the Court for
inquiry. I t is perhaps proper to state, however, that should
the Court be of the opinion that this question is within the
scope of its investigations, we are just as clearly of the opinion that that question should also be answered in the nega-
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tive, and we submit that the arguments and authorities above
referred to will equally well serve to demonstrate the legal
impropriety of proceeding in that manner under our Constitution.

IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE QUESTIONS.
If the Justices—notwithstanding the current of authority
—should say that it is not necessary for the Assembly to ask
"the people" if they want a convention then, at least, the J u s tices should make it plain and unmistakable just what question or questions they are answering—that is to say does the
communication from the Governor involve one question, with
related and interdependent component parts so that an affirmative answer would mean that no constitutional change
proposed by a convention can become effective, whatever
other of the specific provisions may be included in an Act,
unless a provision for submission to "the people" shall be included and until a submission to "the people" shall have been
made and their approval expressed, or
does the communication from the Governor involve several
distinct and separate questions so t h a t affirmative answers
would mean that an act which provided for one or more, but
not all, of the specified provisions might lead to the promulgation of constitutional changes without previous reference
to and approval by "the people."
In order that it may be unequivocally established just what
the Governor's communication means and what the answer
of the Justices may signify it is necessary t h a t the Justices
should be asked this question—
Does the Governor's communication mean that he asks,
and will your opinion mean that you answer the following
comprehensive question, or does t h a t communication mean
that the Governor asks and that your answers will mean that
you answer several questions which are not necessarily re-
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lated and interdependent and that it will not be necessary
for the Assembly, to include in an act a provision that any
constitutional change which may be proposed by a Convention must be submitted to and approved by "the people" before the same becomes effective?
Therefore it is necessary that this Court should announce
whether the following is a correct expression of the true
import and meaning of the Governor's inquiry—
Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the
General Assembly should provide by law—
for a convention to be called to propose a revision of or
amendments to the Constitution of the State;
for the Governor to call for the election, at a date to be
fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such number and manner as the General Assembly shall determine;
for the inclusion of the General Officers of the State in
the membership of such convention by virtue of their offices;
for the organization and conduct of such convention;
for the submission to the people, for their ratification and
adoption or rejection, of any constitution or amendments
proposed by such convention; and
for declaring the result and effect of the vote of the
electors voting upon the questions of such ratification and
adoption or rejection;
if such law shall contain the provision that no revision
of said constitution or amendments thereto which shall be
proposed by such convention shall become effective unless
the same shall have been first submitted to the people as
aforesaid and unless a majority of the electors voting thereon shall have voted ratification and approval thereof?
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V. QUESTIONS ( b ) , ( c ) , ( d ) , ( e ) , A N D ( f ) S H O U L D
BE ANSWERED IN T H E NEGATIVE.
I t is quite plain that if we are correct in the position that
Question (a) should be answered in the negative, each of
the other questions must also be answered negatively. These
latter questions all proceed upon the primary premise that
a convention is to be called by the General Assembly, and
upon that assumption inquire as to whether various steps
and methods can be taken and employed with respect to its
calling, organization, personnel, conduct, submission to the
people of proposals, and declaration of result and effect.
For example, Question (b) inquires relative to method of
election of delegates "to such Convention"; (c) relative to
the legality of the appointment by the Legislature of certain
members "of such Convention"; (d) relative to the organization of "such Convention"; (e) relative to the submission
to the people of any Constitution proposed by "such Convention"; and ( f ) relative to the method of declaring the
result and effect of the vote upon "such ratification and
adoption". The point need not be labored. W e see no
escape from the obvious conclusion that if the answer to
Question (a) is, "No," the answer to the remaining questions is also negative.
VI. ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE O F ARGUMENT
ONLY, THAT QUESTION ( a ) , WITH PROPER
QUALIFICATIONS, BE ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY, QUESTION (b) S H O U L D THEN BE
ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE WITH CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS.
I t is necessary, however, for the sake of the argument, to
assume (without for a moment conceding) t h a t this Court
may not find itself in agreement with our position under
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Question ( a ) ; and upon that assumption it is proper to
advert in detail to the remaining questions.
As to Question (b) : Assuming that this Court should
rule that the General Assembly may validly provide by law
for a Convention to be called to revise or amend the Constitution, it is our position that Question (b) still cannot
be answered in the affirmative without some qualification.
As we see it, the General Assembly would then be proceeding upon an extra-legal basis and would be acting, according
to Mr. Jameson and some other text-writers, as the delegated
agents of the people to provide for the calling of a convention. For that purpose, as we understand the procedure in
such anomalous instances, the delegation is to the General
Assembly and not to the executive, and our view would be
t h a t the General Assembly, and not the Governor, should
call for the election of delegates and should fix the date for
the holding of such convention. We further presume that
in such event it would be competent for the General Assembly to designate the number of delegates and the manner of their election, subject to the important proviso that
the manner of their election and their qualifications, and
the number apportioned to the various districts in the state,
should be so arranged as to provide a body truly representative of the whole people.

VII. QUESTION (c) SHOULD BE ANSWERED
IN THE NEGATIVE.
Question (c) : This question inquires whether the Assembly can validly provide "that the General Officers of the
State shall by virtue of their offices be members of such Convention?"
As to the proper answer to be given to this question, we
believe there cannot be the slightest doubt. I t should clearly be answered in the negative.
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Discussing this matter, as we must at this point, upon
the theory of those who have always maintained the propriety of calling a Constitutional Convention, even those
persons have never, so f a r as we are aware, claimed t h a t the
General Assembly could pack the Convention with its own
nominees. That would be especially unfair where all of
the Assembly's delegates are members of a single political
party.
By hypothesis, and under any sensible interpretation of
Section 1 of Article I, even if the same be applicable in this
situation, the only theory upon which the delegates can be
chosen is t h a t they are the representatives of the whole
people. Their selection is at best extra-legal and extraconstitutional—they
would attend solely because they had
been delegated as representatives of the people, with authority to act only upon the precise question before the Convention, i. e., the framing of an amendment to the Constitution.
But the general officers of the state—the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, General Treasurer,
and Attorney-General, are neither extra-legal nor extraconstitutional.
They are officers appointed under and not
outside of the Constitution, and their powers and duties are
clearly defined. Those powers and duties in no case can,
by any stretch of the imagination, or of judicial interpretation, be considered to extend to acting as delegates of the
whole people in the deliberations of a Constitutional Convention.
The only possible argument which occurs to us which
might be proffered in opposition to our contention is that,
since the general officers are elected by popular vote, they
are therefore representatives of the whole people. The
argument is specious. True, they have been elected by the
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franchise of the people, but they have been elected under the
Constitution, with power to do those things and those only
which fall within the constitutional definitions of, and
limitations upon, their department and powers. All are unquestionably members of the Executive Department, and the
powers and duties of t h a t Department cannot trench upon
either the legislative or the judicial departments; nor, a
fortiori, upon an outside sovereign power.
Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324.
I t is submitted that while the nature of the powers of a
Constitutional Convention is difficult to define (under the
cases), it can truly be said that the purpose of such a Convention is the drafting and recommendation of a Constitution or of amendments thereto; and that being the case, it
appears a fair corollary that its labors are in their nature
rather legislative than executive or judicial.
Looking at the matter a little more broadly, however, if
the Legislature can appoint five delegates, why not ten?
And if ten, why not fifty? Once establish the principle that
delegates to a Constitutional Convention can be directly appointed by the Legislature, then, on principle, there is no
stopping short of its power to appoint all the delegates, or
to declare itself to be a Constitutional Convention, and thereupon to submit a new Constitution to the people at any
time at its own pleasure.
That, however, has been held to be unlawful and unconstitutional in a case often cited by our opponents, namely,
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336-443 (1012).
In that case the Legislature assumed itself to frame a new
Constitution for the people, and to submit it to them for
adoption without the intervention of a Constitutional Convention. I t was held that the Legislature had no power to
propose a new Constitution other than in the specified mode
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prescribed therein, and that the Secretary of State and other
officials would be enjoined from preparing ballots and performing other acts with reference to submitting the proposed new Constitution to the people.
In Baker vs. Moorhead, 174 N. W. 430 (Nebraska, 1919),
the Court said:
"The enactment is to be construed as mandatory, so
that a statute, allowing the Governor to appoint members of the convention, or providing that they shall be
chosen by the Legislature itself, or in any manner other
than by ballot at a free election by all qualified voters
of the state, would be
unconstitutional"
And see Livermore vs. Waite, 102 Cal. 113 (1894).
Even Jameson, the text-writer most often cited against
our main position, has nothing but criticism for the theory
that the Assembly may itself appoint delegates. In his book
on "CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS", 4th Edition, he points
out that Georgia is the only state in which that method was
tried (in 1788—just after the Revolutionary period). In
that early instance the delegates were chosen directly by the
Legislature and Mr. Jameson says:
"The case of the Georgia convention of 1788 to which
the delegates were chosen directly by the Legislature,
it need not be said, was a violation of all principle, and
as a precedent would be f r a u g h t with extreme danger.
So universally has this action of the Georgia legislature been discountenanced that it has never been imitated in that or any other state."
He then distinguishes the action in Rhode Island, in which,
in the adoption of our present Constitution, those who would
be electors under the new Constitution, were allowed to vote,
stating that it was—
"clearly a wise exercise of its legislative discretion to
extend the franchise to those citizens whose just discontent had lately precipitated them into a revolution."
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Careful search has produced no judicial authority which
so much as intimates the propriety of the election of delegates to a Constitutional Convention by the Legislature, and
we believe that no such authority can be found. It is contrary, therefore, alike to the provisions of Section 1 of Article I, to precedent, to legal decision, and to the most elementary principles of Constitutional government. We confidently assert that whether or not Question (c) is to be approached singly or as a part of a general plan of procedure
embracing all the questions, the answer to that question must
be in the negative.

VIII. UPON THE ASSUMPTIONS MADE UNDER VI
QUESTIONS (d), (e) AND (f) SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, BUT WITH
PROPER QUALIFICATIONS.
The fourth question is as to the validity of the exercise of
legislative power:
" ( d ) For the organization and conduct of such convention."
Assuming the validity of "such a Convention" at all, reason and authority suggest to us no objection to proper action
by the General Assembly for its organization along the usual
lines followed in such cases.
The next question inquires as to the power of the Assembly
to provide—
" ( e ) For the submission to the people for their ratification and adoption of any constitutional amendments
proposed by such Convention."
Upon the same assumptions as before, and further assuming that such a Convention can constitutionally be called by
the Legislature, it appears proper, and indeed absolutely necessary, on principle and authority, that the constitutional
amendments framed by the Convention should be submitted
to the people for their ratification, adoption or rejection. As
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rejection is not mentioned in the question, perhaps the Court,
in answering that question (if it should be answered affirmatively) should qualify their answer in that particular.
The last question inquired as to the power of the General
Assembly to provide by law—
" ( f ) For declaring the result and effect of the vote
of a majority of the electors voting upon the question
of such ratification and adoption?"
The meaning of the question is not as clear as could be
wished. We are uncertain what meaning is intended by the
words, "declaring the result and effect of the vote of a majority of the electors". Our position is, and must remain,
flatly, that under our Constitution changes can be constitutionally and legally made only by a three-fifths vote of the
whole people and in the mode prescribed in Article X I I I . If
it is ruled otherwise, and we are proceeding, not under Article X I I I but in the extra-legal method, is the three-fifths
vote of the people still required to adopt? Our own view
would be, Yes—that the Constitution plainly contemplates
that it is not to be changed except by the indicated proportion of electors, and that it is not competent for the General
Assembly to declare that any other or smaller proportion,
can, consistently with the Constitution, make such changes.
If Question (f) were answered in the affirmative, without
qualification, the Assembly might consider it competent to
declare any one of the following results to be in effect:
(a) that a vote of the majority, but less than threefifths, resulted in the adoption of the new Constitution;
(b) that the same vote did not result in the adoption
of a new Constitution;
(c) that a three-fifths' majority either did or did not
so result;
(d) that the entire vote was without effect.
All of these results are strictly and logically possible under
the rather loose wording of Question ( f ) . We submit that
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while, broadly speaking, the question may (without conceding our general contention) be decided by this Court to call
for an affirmative answer, any such answer should contain
rigid qualifications making it clear that any action by the
General Assembly along the lines contemplated would not
be a valid exercise of the legislative power unless it truly reflected and confirmed the action of the electors, whether a majority or three-fifths, as the Court may decide to be the Constitutional proportion required.

IX. CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, we reiterate our settled and sincere belief
that all of the questions ought to be answered in the negative,
and that only in that way will or can the true meaning of our
Constitution be definitely and finally established. A mode
of amendment is prescribed, no crisis impends, no revolution
—even a peaceful or quasi-legal one—is necessary. If changes
are required, they can be made in the future as they have
been in the past in the Constitutional mode. Nothing more
certainly establishes the respect of the people for, and their
reliance upon the opinions of, the judiciary than its acceptance of the guidance of long-settled precedent, usage and authority. The alternative, as we have pointed out, is not final
settlement, but the certainty of continued doubt and agitation as to the true interpretation of our supreme law.
We have found no expression better representing our feelings in the matter than the remarks of counsel in Ekern vs.
McGovern, 142 N. W. Rep. (1913), at page 611, quoted by
Marshall, J., as follows: "When discontent, violence and anarchy shall succeed to law and order,—when the people and
public officers shall depart from the Constitution and desert
the ship of state, I have a hope that the last glimpses that
will be caught of organized government will be the judiciary,
—that courts may be here as long as any vestige of a state
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shall remain; still ready to direct, — still speaking the law
with an even mind, dispensing justice with an even hand, sitting serene and unmoved above the influence of fear and faction, still abiding by the motto so peculiarly their own,—'Fiat
justitia, ruat coelnm
Respectfully submitted,
FREDERICK W .

TILLINGHAST,

ELMER S . CHACE,
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Re Questions Submitted By His Excellency the Governor
to the Supreme Court for Its Opinion in Answer to
Certain Questions Concerning a Constitutional Convention.
STATEMENT
The Questions submitted by His Excellency the Governor
are as follows.
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the
General Assembly should provide by law
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the
Constitution of the State;
" ( b ) that the Governor shall call for the election, at a
date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in
such number and manner as the General Assembly shall determine ;
" ( c ) that the General Officers of the State shall by virtue
of their offices be members of such convention;
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such convention ;
" ( e ) for the submission to the people, for their ratification and adoption, of any constitution or amendments proposed by such convention; and
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote of a
majority of the electors voting upon the question of such
ratification and adoption?"

QUESTION
In this argument I propose to discuss from the legal standpoint only the questions, namely,
Can the General Assembly by legislative act validly—that
is constitutionally—call a constitutional convention, supervise its organization and give validity to its findings on approval by a majority vote of the electors of the state.
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POINT
THE CONSTITUTION OF RHODE ISLAND CAN BE
LAWFULLY AMENDED OR CHANGED ONLY IN
THE MODE WHICH ITSELF PRESCRIBES.
Article X I I I entitled "Of Amendments" sets forth the one
method in clear language and with great detail. No mention of a constitutional convention is made in this or anyother article of the constitution.
The statement of law involved in this question and which
I have herein set forth is contained in a former advisory opinion of this court rendered in 1883.
In re Constitutional Convention 14 R. I. 649.
While it is true that such an opinion has not the binding
effect of a decision (Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324) yet it is
entitled to great weight in view of the cogency of its reasoning and the further fact that it enunciates and establishes
a well settled principle of law which many courts and textwriters have adopted in construing the power of legislatures to change or alter or amend a constitution.
This principle is stated as follows:
W H E R E A CONSTITUTION P R E S C R I B E D
THE
METHOD BY W H I C H IT MAY BE A M E N D E D SUCH
CONSTITUTION MAY BE CHANGED ONLY BY T H E
METHOD P R E S C R I B E D .
Switzer vs. State, 103 Ohio State 306, 316;
Johnson vs. Craft, 205 Ala. 385;
Oakland Paving Co. vs. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479;
Livermore vs. Wait, 102 Cal. 113;
Koehler vs. Hill, 60 la. 543;
State vs. Marcus, 160 Wis. 354;
Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. 39;
6 R. C. L. 31 Par. I l l and cases cited;
12 C. J . 682.
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The reasons for reaching the above sound conclusions
seem to be three in number.
(1) The amending article prescribes and defines the
course to be pursued in the exercise of the sovereign's right
to alter and change its constitution.
The very term constitution implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature whence the provisions therein
for revision implies the will of the people that the underlying principles shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. Therefore, the amending provisions in a constitution
prescribe and define the course to be pursued in the exercise of the inherent power of the people to alter and change
their basic law.
Livermore vs. Wait, supra;
Switzer vs. State, supra;
Johnson vs. Craft, supra;
Erwin vs. Nolan, 280 Mo. 401, 407.
(2)

The power to propose amendments is not legislation.
State vs. Marcus, supra;
Hollingsworth vs. Virginia, 3 Dall (U. S.) 378;
Oakland Paving Co. vs. Hilton, supra.

(3) The constitution expressing one thing in the sense of
specifying excludes things not expressed.
In re Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649.
Applying the foregoing principles and reasoning to Rhode
Island's constitution, we can only reach the following conclusions.
1. All sovereignty is vested in the whole people of the
state. R. I. Constitution Article 1, Sec. 1.
2. The present constitution is the will of the sovereign
in Rhode Island. Every word of it is the sovereign will, and
it is the sole knowledge we have of the sovereign will.
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3. This constitution "till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon
all."
4. The sovereign will has restricted the General Assembly in remaking, altering, or amending the constitution to
the one, sole, and only method prescribed in Article X I I I .
5. I t is the sovereign will not to be invoked in any other
manner.
6. The questions submitted by the Governor must all be
answered in the negative.

CONCLUSION
Because the General Assembly would not be acting under
its legislative power, is limited in the exercise of its amending power to the method prescribed, and can not delegate
any of its powers to the Governor or any other person, it can
not, in the valid exercise of any power it has, expressed or
implied in the constitution, provide by law or legislative
enactment, for a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the State, or for other details concerning
such a convention and its organization, functions, powers,
etc., as set forth in His Excellency's Questions. Hence, these
questions should all be answered in the negative.
Respectfully submitted,
RUSSELL W .

RICHMOND.

State of Rhode
Providence,
Sr.Island

Supreme Court

Re: G O V E R N O R ' S REQUEST FOR OPINION OF
THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS RELATIVE TO AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION

BRIEF OF ZECHARIAH CHAFEE
IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGATIVE SIDE

State of Rhode Island
Providence, Sr.

Supreme Court

Re: Governor's Request for Opinion of the Supreme Court
on Certain Questions Relative to Amendment of the
Constitution.

B R I E F OF ZECHARIAH C H A F E E
IN SUPPORT OF T H E NEGATIVE SIDE
Replying to a request that briefs be submitted to the Court
by others than members of the Bar, I respectfully present
the following brief:
The questions submitted by the Governor to the Court
are interesting. Their immediate purport is somewhat startling, and this is the point to which I would especially ask
the attention of the Court:
The questions submitted by the Governor are the following:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power
if the General Assembly should provide by law
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the State;
" ( b ) that the Governor shall call for the election at
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such
convention in such manner and number as the
General Assembly may determine;
" ( c ) t h a t the General officers of the State shall by
virtue of their offices be members of such convention ;
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such convention ;
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" ( e ) for the submission to the people, for their ratification and adoption, of any Constitution or
amendments proposed by such convention; and
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote
of a majority of the electors voting upon the
question of such ratification and adoption?"
OUTLINE O F ARGUMENT
POINT I
Question ( f ) should be answered in the negative
POINT II
Question (c) should be answered in the negative
POINT III
Question (d) should be answered in the negative
POINT IV
A Convention should not be called. There is no urgent
necessity or preponderant public opinion calling therefor.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Question ( f ) should be answered in the negative
The policy underlying the questions is that the Constitution be reshaped and rewritten, not solely by a Constitutional Convention, but to a very considerable extent by the
Legislature itself in advance of a Constitutional Convention.
Let us look a t Question ( f ) for example.
Article X I I I of the Constitution says t h a t approval of
amendments by the people shall be by 3/5ths of the electors of the State present and voting in Town and W a r d
meetings. Question (f) contemplates t h a t such approval
shall be by a bare majority of the people. Such a change is,
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in my judgment, unconstitutional and an impairment of a
safeguard to which I have been accustomed as against hasty
legislation.
Under cover of a Constitutional Convention other proposed amendments by the Legislature in advance of a constitutional Convention come to mind. The work of a Constitutional Convention, if held under this plan, would be
written in advance by the Assembly to a very considerable
extent.
Such a procedure for amending the Constitution I do not
think is anywhere contemplated in the Constitution.

POINT II
Question (c) should be answered in the negative
Question (c) contemplates a procedure which is somewhat lacking in its appeal to common sense. Administrative
Officers are not ex-officio members of a legislative body or
of a body to which legislative prerogatives have been delegated. The Legislature cannot make the Governor or others
members of the Legislature. That comes through vote of
the people. If the Governor and others wish to be members
of a body exercising legislative functions the proper course
is for them to present themselves as individuals to the
electors and stand or fall by the judgment of the electors as
to their suitability for any desired position. The Legislature is going beyond its function when it proposes to stack
the cards as to membership in a Convention ostensibly to be
filled by candidates selected from and by the people.

POINT III
Question (d) should be answered in the negative
Question (d) conferring upon the Legislature power to
arrange for the organization and conduct of a Constitutional Convention opens the door for rewriting the Constitution in advance in many particulars by the Legislature.
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POINT IV
A Convention should not be called. There is no urgent
necessity or preponderant public opinion calling therefor.
We have been repeatedly told that the divergence from
Article X I I I and the calling of the Constitutional Convention was justified by the fact that there is an overwhelmingpublic sentiment in favor of a change in our Constitution,
and that this sentiment cannot have effect while our Legislature is as a t present constituted. This statement, it should
be noted, is not correct. Question (f) submitted by the Governor to this Court is enlightening in this connection. It
discloses the fact that in the Governor's judgment there is
not an overwhelming desire for the changes which he expects to be presented to the people. He reduces the popular
vote necessary for confirmation from 3/5ths to a bare majority. The desire for haste on the p a r t of the Governor and
his associates f u r t h e r shows his lack of confidence in a
persistent and continuing public sentiment which would
retain in a coming legislature the present preponderance
of votes for the desired changes.
Haste to seize a special opportunity, and narrow margins
in popular vote for adoption, are not consistent with the
tenor of our Constitution, with Article X I I I or for the
good of the State as a whole.
Nor is it correct to say that our Constitution cannot be
amended as it now stands. Such a statement is contrary to
experience. I t has been amended many times within my
own experience. The arguments now adduced have been
adduced many times and shown by time to be unjustifiable.
I recall what was said about the Bourne amendment and
about Women's Suffrage.
Amendments have come in response to definite and permanent phases of opinions. The process is perfectly natural
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and inevitable when the preponderance of our people have
certain convictions and continue to hold them. There is a
weight of public opinion which invariably produces the
votes necessary for the amendments in the Legislatures and
in popular elections. At the moment adequate popular sentiment is lacking for the desired changes.
Having been brought up in Rhode Island I have a respect
for the authors of the Constitution and for those who gave
their approval to this document. I believe these gentlemen
knew what they wanted to say and said it plainly and not
by implication. Article X I I I , to my mind, was made to
stand and does stand until changed as therein provided.
The Legislature cannot delegate to any Assembly privileges which it does not itself possess. It cannot exclude from
any Assembly any of the obligations by which it is itself
restricted. I t cannot by itself amend the Constitution.
Article I X also, I believe, was made to stand and does
stand. Article I X and Article X I I I to my mind are not disunited. I quote them as important considerations now before
the people and before the Court. I ask adherence to them, and
certainly there is no necessity or overwhelming popular sentiment which justifies the lessening of any of the safeguards
customarily attending amendments of the Constitution.
Article IX, Sections 3 and 4 of the Constitution of Rhode
Island reads as follows:
Sec. 3. All general officers shall take the following
engagement before they act in their respective offices, to
wit; You
being by the free vote of the
electors of this State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations, elected unto the place of
do
solemnly swear (or affirm) to be true and faithful unto
this state, and to support the constitution of this state
and of the United States; that you will faithfully and
impartially discharge all the duties of your aforesaid
office to the best of your abilities, according to law: So
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help you God. Or, this affirmation you make and give
upon the peril of the penalty of perjury.
Sec. 4. The members of the general assembly, the
judges of all the courts, and all other officers, both civil
and military, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to
support this constitution, and the constitution of the
United States.
Article X I I I reads as follows:
The general assembly may propose amendments to
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the
members elected to each house. Such propositions for
amendments shall be published in the newspapers, and
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of
state, with the names of all the members who shall have
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions shall
be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or notices by
them issued, for warning the next annual town and
ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall read said
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with
the names of all the representatives and senators who
shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before
the election of senators and representatives shall be had.
If a majority of all the members elected to each house,
at said annual meeting, shall approve any proposition
thus made, the same shall be published and submitted
to the electors in the mode provided in the act of approval ; and if then approved by three-fifths of the electors of the state present and voting thereon in town and
ward meetings, it shall become a p a r t of the constitution of the state.
Respectfully submitted,
ZECHARIAH

CHAFEE,

5 Cooke Street,
Providence, Rhode Island.

